A Free Drawing Graphical Password Scheme by Alice J. Lin & Fuhua (frank Cheng
A Free Drawing Graphical Password Scheme 
 
Alice J. Lin and Fuhua (Frank) Cheng 
 
University of Kentucky, ajlin0@cs.uky.edu, cheng@cs.uky.edu 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This paper presents a method for freely drawing a graphical password. The new 
method achieves better security than conventional textual passwords and other 
graphical password schemes. With this method it is also easier for a user to remember 
the password. The basic idea of the new method is to use a number of the user's 
representative sample drawings to predict the user's future drawing prediction 
interval. The predicted values are obtained by conducting the least squares method to 
the polynomial regression model. Based on the predicted values and deviation of the 
user's sample drawings, a prediction interval for the signature/picture is generated. 
This prediction interval is used as the password and, subsequently, if the 
signature/picture drawn by a user lies within the prediction interval, the user is 
authenticated into the application. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Authenticating users in network-based and Internet-based environments has been a challenge for 
network administrators and end users. The most popular computer authentication method is for a 
user to submit a user name and a textual password. The vulnerabilities of this method are well known. 
One of the main problems is the difficulty of remembering passwords. Studies show that users tend to 
pick short passwords or passwords that are easy to remember [1]. Unfortunately, these passwords can 
also be easily figured out or broken. 
 
Despite their vulnerabilities, textual passwords are still the most commonly used authentication 
mechanism. Although organizations may adopt “strong” password policies [4] that encourage or 
require users to select passwords less susceptible to discovery, such policies typically increase the 
burden on the users’ ability to remember those passwords [14]. Users tend to type such passwords 
(considered a non-dictionary word) about 40 percent slower than dictionary words [9], making the data 
entry process for such authentication more vulnerable to shoulder-surfing attacks. Alternative 
authentication solutions, such as token-based or biometric authentication, do not rely on the users’ 
memory and introduce an increased level of security at the expense of increased hardware and 
software costs and usability, and are therefore not used as frequent means of user authentication [2], 
[5], [12]. Since a user’s biometrics are fundamental parts of his/her identity, and may also be used for 
many other purposes, the risks from this information being stolen or captured are extremely high. 
Once compromised, biometrics cannot be changed. That is another reason that biometric information 
is not suitable for authentication. 
 
Graphical password schemes have been proposed as a possible alternative to text-based schemes, 
motivated partially by the fact that humans can remember pictures better than texts; psychological 
studies support such assumption [7]. Pictures are generally easier to remember or recognize than texts. 
In addition, if the number of possible pictures is large enough, the possible password space of a 
graphical password scheme may exceed that of text-based schemes and thus presumably offer better 
resistance to dictionary attacks. Because of these advantages, there is a growing interest in graphical 
passwords. In addition to workstation and web log-in applications, graphical passwords have also been 
applied to ATM machines and mobile devices.  
 2. RELATED WORK 
Among existing graphical password schemes, there are recognition-based and recall-based graphical 
techniques. Using recognition-based techniques, a user is presented with a set of images and the user 
passes the authentication by recognizing and identifying the images he or she selected during the 
registration stage. Using recall-based techniques, a user is asked to reproduce something that he or she 
created or selected earlier during the registration stage. 
 
As shown in the studies by Davis et al. [3], for recognition-based techniques, users’ choices of picture 
passwords are often predictable. Allowing users to use their own pictures would make the password 
even more predictable, especially if the attacker is familiar with the user. 
 
For the recall-based category, Jermyn et al. [6] proposed a scheme, called “Draw-a-secret (DAS)”. A user 
is asked to draw a simple picture on a 2D grid. During authentication, the user is asked to re-draw the 
picture. If the drawing touches the same grids in the same sequence, the user is authenticated. Thorpe 
and van Oorschot [10] analyzed the memorable password space of the DAS scheme.  They introduced 
the concept of graphical dictionaries and studied the possibility of a brute-force attack using such 
dictionaries. They defined a length parameter for the DAS type graphical passwords and showed that 
DAS passwords of length 8 or larger on a 5 x 5 grid may be less susceptible to dictionary attack than 
textual passwords. They also showed that the space of mirror symmetric graphical passwords is 
significantly smaller than the full DAS password space. Since people recall symmetric images better 
than non-asymmetric images, it is expected that a significant fraction of users will choose mirror 
symmetric passwords. If so, then the security of the DAS scheme may be substantially lower than 
originally believed.  
 
Van Oorschot and Thorpe [11] further quantitatively analyzed the size of these classes for DAS under 
convenient parameter choices and showed that the popular subspace is a surprisingly small proportion 
of the full password space. 
 
Syukri et al. [8] proposed a system where authentication is conducted by having the user drawing 
his/her signature using a mouse. Their technique includes two stages, registration and verification. 
During the registration stage: the user will first be asked to draw their signature with a mouse, and the 
system will extract the signature area. The information will later be saved into the database. The 
verification stage first takes the user input and extracts parameters of the signature. After that, the 
system conducts verification using geometric average means and a dynamic update of the database. 
According to a survey performed by Zhu et al. [15], the signature recognition program is not reliable.   
 
3. OUR APPROACH 
The expressive movement in handwriting or drawing is made chiefly in a state of unawareness, 
automatically and impulsively. In his/her handwriting or artistic expression a person not only 
communicates his/her conscious thought but also his/her underlying thought, by which graphic 
movement becomes a “diagram of the unconscious”. Graphic movements reveal certain consistencies 
which cannot be explained by chance, nor by learning, nor by imitation of a set pattern [13].  These 
unconscious movements are unique for everyone.  
 
However, one should also understand that human actions can not be precisely repeated, especially 
unconscious actions. If one asks a person to draw a signature/picture several times, the results will be 
close but can never reach the "exactly the same" level. Actually the degree of closeness varies from 
time to time, depending not only on the person's mental and physical conditions, but also on the 
external environment. Therefore, using only one sample drawing of a user to predict the user's future 
drawing pattern obviously is not a reliable approach. One needs to use a set of sample drawings to do 
the prediction. The best scenario is to collect as many variations of the user's drawing as possible so 
that future drawings of the user can all be covered by this set of sample drawings. This certainly is not 
possible. An alternative is to collect enough representative sample drawings so that future drawings 
can all be covered by combinations of those representative sample drawings. 
 In this paper, to build a set of representative sample drawings, a user is asked to draw a 
signature/picture certain times first. This set of sample drawings is then used to create combinations 
of the collected sample drawings in the form of a banded signature/picture (see Figure 6), called a 
prediction interval. This prediction interval is set as the password for the application. When a user 
needs to access this application, the user is prompted to draw his/her signature/picture. If the 
signature/picture lies inside the prediction interval, the drawing is accepted. Details of our approach 
are described below.  
 
Assume the user draws six times to set up a password (Fig. 1, Fig 2). First we normalize the drawings 
so that they are all of the same size. Whatever input device the user uses: stylus, touchpad, touch 
screen or mouse, pixels of the drawings are then converted into point coordinates in the order of 
user's input. Each drawing is then segmented at significant points. Segments at the same location are 
considered as the same part. For each part of the curve we assume there are  n  points (Fig. 3 shows 
three parts).  11 22 ( , ),( , ), ,( , ). nn xy xy xy ⋅⋅⋅  
   
               
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.1 Polynomial regression model 
We use a polynomial regression model to predict the user’s future drawing values in a part of the curve 
if user drawing does not contain too much fluctuation. 
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 Fig. 1: Six times of free draw using mouse. 
 
  Fig. 2: Six times of free draw using stylus.   and 
01 ˆˆ ˆ , ,..., |
ββ β β
∂
=
∂ p
j
L
1
2(
n
i
i
y
=
−− ∑ 0
ˆ β
1
ˆ )0
p
j
ji
j
x β
=
−= ∑   (3.5) 
1,2,..., . j p =  The predicted polynomial model is  
  ˆi y = 0
ˆ β +
1
ˆ
p
j
ji
j
x β
= ∑   (3.6) 
 
In Fig.3, the red curves are the predicted values and blue curves are 95% prediction interval for three 
segments of the user's drawing in Fig. 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.2 The B-spline regression model 
We use B-spline regression model  to predict the user’s future drawing values if the user’s drawing 
contains lots of fluctuation. B-spline basis functions combine the Polynomial smoothness and broken 
stick local influence. 
 
For the illustration, we decompose drawing to several smaller parts, and show the differences of 
predicted values and intervals generated from Fig. 2 by polynomial regression model (see Fig. 3) and B-
spline regression model (see Fig. 4).    
 
Given n+1 control points,  01 , ,. . . , n PP P.  i u is a knot. The total sequence is a knot vector and  1 ii uu + ≤  
The B-spline curve of degree d is defined by these control points and knot vector is  
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k Y is the sample data.  0,1,2,... km = . The specified set of control points j P  are unknown parameter.  k ε  
is the error. We use the same method as 3.1 to best estimate of j P . 
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Fig. 3: Predicted values and prediction intervals generated by polynomial regression model.  
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3.3 Prediction interval 
 
The probability density function of t distribution (Fig. 5) is  
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ν  is the number of degrees of freedom and  Γ is the Gamma function.   t −∞ < < ∞ .  The area 
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Fig. 4: Predicted values and prediction intervals generated by B-spline regression model  
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The predicted regression model is  ˆ ˆ yX β =  
 
We need to assess the uncertainty in prediction. Decision makers need more than just a point estimate 
to make rational choices. Given a set of particular values of the variables, 12 , ,..., ii i k xx x , 
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  Fi g. 5: The probability density function. The numerator is the error and the denominator is degrees of freedom.  1 pk =+. The margin of error 
ˆi y tS E
∗ decreases as the confidence level C and the standard deviation  ˆ σ  decreases, and the sample size 
n increases. 
The values of 
2 ˆ σ  will be large if the input  i y  are widely spread around their predicted values, and 
2 ˆ σ s will be small if the  i y  are all close to the predicted values. 
                                         
 Prediction interval for future user drawing is:    
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In Figure 6 the green curves define a 95% prediction interval; the blue lines define a 99% prediction 
interval. We are 95% confident that in the future if the user tries to draw the same picture, each point 
will lie within the region bounded by the green curves. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.4 Success rate 
If the sample size n is large, the standard error will be small (see Eqn. 3.14). Based on our trial, the 
more times a user draws the same picture, the more accurate the prediction calculation. Tab. 1 shows 
the success rate for users using different pictures as password when he/she tried to login. The success 
rate is the successful times divided by total trial times.  Number of draws is that a user draws a certain 
times of a picture to set a password. We can see that success rate goes up with the number of draws 
increasing.  
 
Tab. 2 shows the successful login rate that a user uses different pictures or letters as password. Using 
the pictures created by user or letters that he/she usually writes has higher successful rate while 
copying pictures/letters created by others has much lower successful rate. Copying pictures/letters 
created by others as user’s password is not a good idea. Since it is not out of your nature, the copied 
pictures/letters are easily to be forgotten. This may be the reason for low successful rate in login. This 
result may support that one’s signature is best candidate used for password. 
  
            
          Pi ctur es 
Number  
Of draws       
2  0.75 0.63 0.65 0.70 0.65 
4  0.80 0.78 0.77 0.83 0.76 
Fig. 6: The green curves define a 95% prediction interval and the blue lines define a 
99% prediction interval.  The red curves are the predicted values. The pink lines in 
the background are user’s drawing. 6  0.92 0.88 0.89 0.93 0.87 
8  0.97 0.92 0.95 0.93 0.90 
10  0.99 0.96 0.97 0.99 0.95 
 
    Tab . 1:  N umb er  of  draws in  p assword setting vs. successful login rate for different pictures 
 
Number of draw  Created a picture  Copy a picture  Created letters  Copy letters 
5 0.87  0.75  0.90  0.76 
8 0.96  0.80  0.97  0.70 
11 0.97  0.87  0.99  0.88 
 
               Tab . 2: Successf ul  l ogin  rate usin g differ en t p ictur es/l etter s as p asswor d 
 
4. CONCLUSION 
A new graphical password scheme is presented in this paper. In addition to the intrinsic advantage of 
being less vulnerable to brute force and dictionary attacks, the new method also has the following 
advantages. First, the new method gives a user the freedom of drawing anything he/she wants to draw 
and the ease in remembering his/her password. Consequently, the new method is especially efficient 
for input devices such as stylus or touch screen. Second, the new method achieves better security than 
conventional textual password and other graphical password schemes. This follows from the fact that 
the new method has an infinite password space, therefore the password is more secure. Besides, since 
the signature/picture is difficult to reproduce by others, it is relative secure to shoulder-surfing 
attacks. Even if a person knows what you drew, it will have very little chance for him/her to draw the 
same thing as you did. Since the signatures/pictures are usually not symmetric, the password space 
will not be compromised by the symmetric issue [11]. 
 
Future research directions include studying the best size and better sampling techniques for the 
sample drawing set and better techniques in generating the prediction interval. 
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